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In recent decades there has been a growing historical interest in ‘second rank’ officials 
who, while they do not play a leading role in government or political movements, can 
influence the way decisions are shaped and executed. At the same time, the interest of 
scholars in American policy during the Vietnam War shows no signs of abating.  This 
essay investigates experience of one second rank official during the war, David Bruce, 
who was Ambassador to London during 1961-69. Making particular use of Bruce’s 
extensive diaries, it traces his shifting views on the war, looks at the extent to which he 
shared the outlook of other officials and asks what influence, if any, he had on events. It 
argues that, while he always remained loyal to his own government and often mirrored 
the outlook of the Johnson administration, Bruce had his own perspective on events, was 
consistently critical of US tactics on the ground and in the Spring of 1967, influenced by 
Robert McNamara, became an early advocate of retrenchment. 
 
In recent decades there has been a growing historical interest in what might be called 
‘second rank’ officials who, while they do not play a leading role in government or 
political movements, can nonetheless influence the way decisions are shaped and 
executed.1 Where the Vietnam war is concerned there is a large number of officials 
whose role in proceedings might usefully be investigated, one of whom was David Bruce. 
He had only a peripheral role in United States decision-making on the Vietnam War, at 
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least until 1970, when he was named by President Richard Nixon to head the American 
team at the Paris peace negotiations.2 Although extracts from Bruce’s diary serve to 
enliven the State Department’s volumes of published documents on the conflict3, he 
attended key meetings in Washington only intermittently during Lyndon Johnson’s 
Presidency, his main role being to serve as Ambassador to London. It is quite possible to 
write a detailed account of the descent into the Vietnam quagmire without mentioning 
him.4 Nonetheless, his outlook on the war serves to illuminate US policy. He was a long-
standing member of the country’s foreign policy hierarchy during the first decades of the 
Cold War, having taken a leading role in administering the Marshall Plan, before 
becoming ambassador to Paris, Bonn and, in 1961, London. He had long known key 
figures like George Ball, Dean Rusk and Averell Harriman, who played a more 
prominent role in the Vietnam proceedings. Furthermore, although his experience 
focused on Western Europe, he was in Paris during France’s bitter colonial war in 
Indochina, which gave him an insight into the problems of fighting Ho Chi Minh’s 
nationalist-communist forces. Earlier than that, wartime service in the Office of Strategic 
Services had given him an appreciation of unconventional warfare techniques, which he 
later believed the US army should focus upon in Vietnam.  
 
This essay investigates what Bruce’s experience, as one of the ‘second rank’ of 
officials, can shed on ‘Lyndon Johnson’s War.’ It traces his shifting views on the war, 
looks at the extent to which he shared the outlook of other officials and asks what 
influence, if any, he had on events. The essay particularly exploits the evidence to be 
found in Bruce’s diary, which includes far more than could ever be reflected in Foreign 
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Relations of the United States. Typed up at length, on an almost daily basis, it gives a 
remarkably detailed insight into the life of a twentieth century ambassador and includes 
numerous references to Vietnam – beginning with a conversation with Averell Harriman 
in October 1961, when the situation in South Vietnam was already described as 
‘critical’.5 
 
Bruce’s sources 
Although he made only intermittent visits Washington during his London 
ambassadorship, Bruce had numerous sources that could keep him informed about 
Vietnam. These arguably gave him a broader, more detached view than was possible in 
the US capital. Of course, he was better versed than any other American on British views 
of the war.6 Aside from meetings with the British government, and sometimes with their 
experts on Vietnam7, he became all too aware of the popular dislike of the carnage in 
Southeast Asia. As early as July 1964 the philosopher Bertrand Russell led a delegation 
of the Movement for Colonial Freedom to the embassy, delivering what Bruce called ‘a 
well stated, but unconvincing diatribe against US policy in South Vietnam.’8 Anti-war 
demonstrations outside the embassy building became a regular event from early 1965. 
True, there were elements in British politics who strongly supported the Americans, not 
least the right-wing Conservative Party. When Bruce talked to their Foreign Affairs 
Committee at the House of Commons in February 1965, their chief worry seemed to be a 
communist take-over in Saigon.9 Furthermore, Bruce never believed that Harold Wilson, 
Labour Prime Minister after October 1964, would be tempted to make political capital 
out of Vietnam at US expense. Nonetheless, the Ambassador warned Washington in mid-
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1965 that the war was a sensitive issue for the British. ‘They are very much aware of the 
increased troop commitment and our expanded combat mission [and] of the dangers of 
the air war in North Vietnam…’ This made the Ambassador eager to keep them ‘fully 
and currently informed of our thinking and of our plans in Vietnam.’10  
 
 Though he spent most of his time in London, the ambassador also had plenty of 
information on thinking within his own government. He made quite frequent if irregular 
visits to Washington, sometimes several times per year, and participated in some of 
President Johnson’s discussions about Vietnam. There were written instructions from 
Washington, of course, which made the ambassador himself part of the war effort. In July 
1965, for example, he personally delivered a telegram from Johnson to Wilson explaining 
the need to double US troop levels in Vietnam.11 Bruce did not just muster British 
support. In July 1964, when Commonwealth leaders met in London, he was asked to 
encourage the Australian and New Zealand premiers (already well-disposed to the US on 
Vietnam) to tackle Pakistani President Ayub Khan about the importance of the war in 
Vietnam and of the ‘more flags’ campaign, designed to get allied troops committed on 
the ground.12 He also met numerous US officials when they visited London, a regular 
destination for high-level visitors. One, in May 1964, was William Bundy, Assistant 
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, who came over as part of a broader 
tour and talked to British ministers about Southeast Asia. Bruce felt that his colleague 
delivered a ‘brilliant exposition of American thinking’, warning the British that, ‘We 
cannot afford any longer to be considered a “paper tiger”… The President is considering 
this weekend whether the Administration is prepared, if necessary, to use American 
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forces’ in Vietnam and Laos.13 Four months later, the US Ambassador to Saigon, Cabot 
Lodge, was over to ask the British for help with training the South Vietnamese police. 
Lodge also gave Bruce an insight into the problems in dealing with the South’s leader, 
General Nguyen Khanh, who was ‘currently immobilized at Dalat, suffering from 
haemorrhoids and high blood pressure.  He treats lackadaisically pleas to return to the 
capital.’14  
 
Bruce had links to other governments with a close interest in Vietnam. One was 
the South Vietnamese ambassador in London. In 1961 this was Ngo Dinh Luyen, 
youngest brother of the President, Ngo Dinh Diem. Calling on him for the first time in 
October 1961, Bruce found that he shared ‘the general political philosophy of his family 
– feeling a benevolent, paternalistic but authoritarian government most appropriate for 
Vietnam in its present state of political immaturity.’15 The American seems to have been 
more favourably impressed by one of Luyen’s successors, Le Ngoc Chan, a former 
opponent of Diem but a convineced anti-communist. In April 1967 he talked ‘sensibly 
and restrainedly’ to Bruce about ‘the many difficulties’ in South Vietnam. But Chan was 
rather less realistic when it came to dealing with the British public. In July 1967, with 
anti-Vietnam war protests at their height, he suggested to Bruce that they might hire a 
thousand-seater hall for a conference that would attack the Viet Cong and North Vietnam. 
Bruce was aghast, predicting that anti-war organisations ‘would sweep us away and 
attendant demonstrations precipitate a riot.’16 Other information could be gleaned from 
foreign dignitaries who visited London. In October 1963, for example, Prince Souvanna 
Phouma of Laos told the ambassador of his interest in French President Charles de 
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Gaulle’s call for a united Vietnam as part of a process leading to the neutralisation of 
Indochina.17 There was readier access, of course, to European politicians including, for 
example, Jean Monnet, the architect of European integration and an old friend of Bruce. 
In one of their conversations in May 1964, Monnet advised that it was worth the US 
trying to get the USSR sympathetic to its policies, something that might be possible given 
the current Soviet fear of China.18 This interesting suggestion was ahead of its time: in 
the mid-60s, the Soviets tended to compete with China for North Vietnamese favour and 
war in Southeast Asia helped sour hopes of détente. 
 
Bruce and Escalation, 1963-65 
These varied sources of information and opinion, as well as his deep experience of 
international affairs, allowed Bruce to draw his own conclusions about developments. 
Often during 1963-4, at least in the privacy of his diary, he tended to view events in a 
negative light. In August 1963, for example, he considered the situation ‘deeply 
disturbing’, commenting that Diem and his family were ‘behaving like idiots in 
oppressing the Buddhists, who comprise 90% of the population.’ A few months later, 
reflecting on his conversation with Souvanna Phouma, Bruce was sceptical about the idea 
that Vietnam could be neutralised – fearing that Ho Chi Minh was sure to ‘gobble up’ the 
whole country if a deal on unity and neutralisation were attempted. But he also 
commented: ‘I do, however, question the assumption of our military that the South 
Vietnamese will win the war within the next eighteen months. I heard the same sort of 
optimism expressed by the French for years about Indo-China.’19 Towards the end of the 
year, in the wake of the assassinations of both Diem and President John F. Kennedy, and 
 7 
having heard rumours of strife between the US Ambassador to Saigon, Cabot Lodge, and 
the head of the US Military Assistance Command, General Paul Harkins, Bruce was 
equally despondent: ‘in spite of the optimism breathed by many American officers… I 
doubt the ability within a reasonable time of inspiring the Vietnamese under United 
States tutelage to the efficiency and drill of warfare, which is demanded in order to meet 
the infiltration of the Viet Cong’.20 In August 1964 he still considered the situation in 
Vietnam ‘chaotic’ and after the Gulf of Tonkin resolution was passed, paving the way for 
the Johnson administration to fight in Vietnam, Bruce was soon aware that it might all be 
based on an illusion. He feared that the supposed torpedo-boat attack on US vessels, 
which had led to the resolution, might not have occurred at all. Looking over reports the 
Ambassador speculated ‘that if there were any whales in the Gulf, perhaps they had been 
mistaken for ships’ by the Americans.21 It is a statement curiously reminiscent of 
Johnson’s comment that ‘those dumb stupid sailors were firing at flying fish.’22 
 
Yet, whatever doubts he had about US policy, Bruce was very much a patriot and 
a firm anti-communist, suspicious of any course that might lead to an American retreat. 
In May 1964 he wrote that:  
Neutralization of the former Indo-China states is probably, in the long run, the 
only solution.  But negotiation now, when the Laotians and South Vietnamese are 
on the run, will not be fruitful.  The situation must be stabilized before a final 
solution is attempted, so that the Chinese, Ho Chi Minh and the rest realize they 
cannot gain full control of the area.23  
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Some days later, after learning from William Bundy that the President was looking at 
military intervention, Bruce ‘hoped, if we are determined as an ultimate resort to use 
American armed forces, that once our enemies realize the implications of such action 
they will cease aggression and there may be some peaceful, if not wholly satisfactory, 
compromise.’24 When he visited Washington in November 1964 he met Defense 
Secretary Robert McNamara’s and agreed with him ‘that we must either abandon our 
policy of protecting that part of the world against Communism, or else intervene more 
vigorously to assure its integrity.  The first alternative is unacceptable, the second 
necessary, though hazardous.’25 Like so many other US officials, despite his grave doubts 
about defeating the Viet Cong, Bruce could neither contemplate withdrawal from 
Southeast Asia nor see how neutralization could work, leaving greater US involvement as 
the only option.  
 
Having returned to London, Bruce heard more arguments in favour of 
neutralisation, this time from a respected American, Robert Blum of the Council on 
Foreign Relations. ‘He feels’, Bruce noted, that ‘the situation has probably deteriorated 
there to such a point that we can scarcely expect to redress it considerably within a 
reasonable period of time, since so many of the South Vietnamese are disaffected.’ Yet 
Blum added that, in order to enforce any settlement, the US would at least have to 
threaten the use of force against North Vietnam.26 Such arguments were revealing of the 
complex problem the administration faced and, when the Ambassador was back in 
America in December he ‘found opinions acrimoniously divided over our present policy 
in Vietnam.’ Bruce’s view was that there was ‘considerable merit’ in the argument that, 
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with no easy solution apparent, the US must doggedly resist communist pressure.27 This 
was in line with administration policy. For, with Johnson now elected President in his 
own right following the November election, and with key advisers like McNamara and 
the National Security Adviser, McGeorge Bundy, arguing that the situation in South 
Vietnam could no longer be allowed to drift, the administration was about to escalate its 
involvement dramatically.  
 
Until now, of course, the US had not committed its own forces to the war, other 
than in an advisory role or through the short-lived, punitive bombing raids that had 
followed the Gulf of Tonkin incident. However, continued attacks on US servicemen, 
culminating in one at a helicopter base at Pleiku on 6 February 1965, led Johnson to 
adopt a more sustained bombing campaign against North Vietnam. When the ambassador 
arrived in Washington shortly afterwards he found that, ‘The threatening situation in 
Vietnam overshadows all other foreign problems.’28 Meeting the President in Washington 
on the 10th, Bruce had expected to be quizzed about relations with Britain, but found his 
host obsessed with Vietnam. The Ambassador tried to plead ignorance of the issue, but 
Johnson ‘insisted on my expressing an opinion on certain contingencies.’ Bruce ‘told him 
I hoped American ground troops would not be used in North Vietnam in the absence of 
massive attack by Chinese soldiers; but that we would be able to attain our objectives by 
air strikes.’ Such views fitted neatly with the majority of the administration at this point, 
which opted for a bombing campaign, Operation Rolling Thunder, instead of a 
commitment of ground troops.29 A few days later, Bruce attended a meeting in the White 
 10 
House at which Johnson confirmed the preference for a bombing campaign against 
military targets in North Vietnam, which would ‘cease when aggression stops.’30 
 
Until now Bruce’s need to consider Vietnam had been quite sporadic, but the 
launch of Rolling Thunder made it a consistent concern. Prime Minister Wilson had 
already pledged his sympathy US policy on Vietnam31 and, when Rolling Thunder began, 
Bruce rightly predicted a ‘good deal of adverse newspaper comment… but support by 
Government.’32 Nonetheless, Wilson, facing opposition to US policy from within his own 
party and concerned that the war could escalate further, was keen to be kept informed of 
US thinking. He had hopes of playing a mediatory role in its resolution, building on 
Britain’s role as co-chair of the Geneva conference, which had first met in 1954 to try to 
resolve Vietnam’s future.33 For its part, Washington was keen to influence what Wilson 
said in public about the war and Johnson personally became resentful of what he saw as a 
lack of co-operation from the Prime Minister. 34 This put Bruce in an awkward position, 
not helped by a visit from the British Foreign Secretary to Washington, in March, when 
he publicly criticized the Americans after gas was used in South Vietnam. Fortunately, 
Johnson, though upset by Stewart’s action, decided not to make a transatlantic crisis of it. 
Instead he explained to Bruce how he saw himself as a moderate voice on Vietnam: 
Some favored abandonment of all our commitments in the East, and retreat to 
Hawaii.  Others wanted to bomb the hell out of China.  Others would kill all the 
civilians, as well as military, in the Hanoi district.  He intended to continue to 
make measured responses to aggression from North Vietnam until it ceased.  We 
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had obligated ourselves under three Presidents to assist the South Vietnamese to 
preserve their liberties, and that commitment would be carried out.35 
 
The ambassador, too, preferred a moderate approach. Yet, while he loyally 
supported the President, Bruce’s diary reveals continuing, private doubts about aspects of 
the war. For one thing, he was despondent about the continuing political instability in 
Saigon and Washington’s apparent inability to end it. In late February 1965, as he 
awaited news on the latest spat between Khanh and his fellow generals, Bruce even 
wrote: ‘Washington’s lid of secrecy is clamped tight; of course, it is possible they know 
little more of what is happening in Saigon than they read in the newspapers. Our 
intelligence people there seem woefully ineffective in discovering incipient rebellions.’36 
Coming from a former OSS officer, it was a damning indictment. He was also keen to 
keep the bombing campaign within certain bounds. When McNamara visited London in 
May and asked the Ambassador’s view on hitting Soviet-supplied aircraft and surface-to-
air missile sites, Bruce responded that ‘it was unwise to do so unless the build-up became 
considerably greater than now indicated; I believe we should immediately approach the 
Russians, through diplomatic channels, to apprise them of our familiarity with what they 
are doing…’ Later, he warned McNamara that, ‘if we bomb Hanoi, or even Haiphong, 
and civilians are killed, any Government here would have to express disapproval.’37 In 
June the Ambassador recognised ‘unease in UK political circles based on feeling that… 
authorization to use US troops for combat in Vietnam represents a new phase in 
escalating the conflict, which will place additional strains on Wilson’s ability to maintain 
support for US actions…’.38  The first US ground troops had landed at Da Nang in 
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March, but their numbers were about to increase significantly. The need to manage 
British public opinion was such that Bruce asked the administration to send an eminent 
speaker to make the US case during a ‘teach-in’ at Oxford University. The choice 
eventually fell on Cabot Lodge, but he got a rough handling from the audience, which a 
despairing Bruce felt ‘reflects nothing but discredit on the famous British sense of 
sportsmanship and fair play.’39 It was a sign of greater bitterness to come. 
 
An American War 
As US forces took on the brunt of fighting the communists in Vietnam, Bruce loyally 
continued to back the official line on the war in public. In October 1965, speaking to the 
Embassy wives group, he argued that the communists had made no progress in recent 
months, that the US army could not be defeated and that bombing was both strengthening 
South Vietnamese morale and increasing defections from the Viet Cong. He set out what 
was at stake in stark terms: ‘The issue is whether the world is to have peace, permitting 
people and countries to develop in their own way undisturbed by external aggression 
committed in this instance under the guise of a War of National Liberation.’40 In the early 
months of large-scale US involvement there was room for optimism, as large-scale 
battles claimed considerable Viet Cong losses. In November, the Secretary of State, Dean 
Rusk, gave Bruce an upbeat assessment of the war when the Ambassador was in 
Washington. However, Rusk also admitted that, despite its losses, Hanoi showed no 
inclination to enter peace talks.41 A similar sense of doubt crept into a conversation 
between Bruce and McNamara, when the latter visited London later that month: 
McNamara was ‘aware of no indications reflecting a wish by the Hanoi Government to 
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meet us at a conference table.’  This was disturbing because he also believed ‘there will 
have to be a large increase in the number of American troops in South Vietnam, perhaps 
to the extent of having 350,000 troops stationed there.’42 The Defense Secretary’s worries 
were reflected in a memorandum to the President at the end of the month which warned 
that ‘the odds are even that we will be faced in early 1967 with a “no-decision” at an even 
higher level’ of US deaths.43 Some influential Americans were already deeply troubled 
about the long-term implications. Scotty Reston of the New York Times, for one, was 
‘gloomy about our prospects in Vietnam.’ He warned Bruce in December that ‘the 
present strong support for our policy there will diminish as casualties rise, either inducing 
greater demands for our withdrawal or, contrariwise, pressures to escalate it further, at 
least to the point of bombing Hanoi and Haiphong.’44  
 
 When Bruce made his usual trip back home for Christmas he explored ideas with 
his Washington-based colleagues on how to escape the Vietnam imbroglio. A particular 
theme that grew in his thinking was the need to involve the Soviet Union in bringing 
about the elusive peace talks. The ambassador spoke with McNamara on two occasions 
about sending the veteran Democratic foreign policy expert, Averell Harriman – envoy to 
Joseph Stalin during the Second World War – to Moscow, to try to ‘explain frankly the 
different courses of action we might be forced to take in Vietnam unless a conference is 
soon arranged.’45 Without a peace conference, McNamara feared that US force numbers 
in Vietnam could climb above 400,000 by the end of 1966 and that potentially dangerous 
steps might be taken to break the deadlock, such as mining the chief North Vietnamese 
harbour at Haiphong, which carried the risk of sinking Soviet ships. Bruce based his 
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approach on two arguments. First, that it was ‘impracticable at present for us to approach 
directly either the Chinese or North Vietnamese Government, although we should 
encourage others to do so.  But we can enlarge our discourse with the Soviets,’ who 
might be induced to work for a conference. Second, Dean Rusk, was ‘unlikely to make 
progress with [Soviet foreign minister, Andrei] Gromyko, since Gromyko is merely a 
hack mouthpiece.  The President should somehow establish contact’ with premier Alexei 
Kosygin, who, in a dual leadership with Communist party chief Leonid Brezhnev, 
handled relations with non-communist states. Bruce feared that special mission by 
Harriman to Moscow would attract too much media interest, but that he might be 
appointed Ambassador to Moscow for a time. In what may have been another throwback 
to the Second World War, Bruce also suggested that President Johnson ‘could also 
supplement such activity by personal correspondence.’46 The Ambassador saw his old 
friend Harriman during this visit, too, finding him fearful of the results of any negotiation 
over Vietnam but also believing this ‘preferable to a continuance of war’, while a talk 
with Dean Rusk, who wanted to dwell on past American decisions on Vietnam, left Bruce 
philosophical: ‘it is futile to dwell upon a hypothetical past.  We cannot, and should not, 
throw in our hand; yet to play it to a point where it might involve us and others in a big 
time war would be a grave error… Steadfast patience is our hope, but this is difficult for 
our impatient people to stomach.’47 
 
 It was at this point that the full scale of the US dilemma in Vietnam really seems 
to have dawned on Bruce. Concern about the persistence of the enemy was again a major 
factor in his thinking:  
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A Westerner might well conclude there was no profit for the North Vietnamese in 
continuing a struggle against the most powerful nation in the world.  Yet, they 
defeated the French, they are infiltrated and indoctrinated under press control, by 
stories of defeatism and division in the United States; the Chinese spur them on...  
The Ambassador even felt that Hanoi might adopt negotiation as a trap, in which ‘almost 
every nation will attempt to persuade us to make unwise concessions.’ He shared the fear 
that, as McNamara and Reston argued, ‘American opinion, now in majority favoring our 
present policy will, as casualties mount, become more critical, demanding withdrawal or 
rash adventures through escalation.’ And he recognized, too, the tragedy that the war 
represented for Lyndon Johnson, writing that ‘The President is in a terrifying position.  
The bright prospects of his imaginative Great Society are already dimmed by the 
mounting costs of our involvement in Vietnam, his inherited scourge.’48  
 
 Nothing came of diplomatic efforts to end the war at this point. The US 
government did try to entice Hanoi into talks by announcing a pause in the bombing 
campaign in December, but there was no response from the communists. The 
Ambassador found himself on the periphery of the debate over abandoning it, which was 
eventually resolved in favour of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who argued that the lull in 
bombing merely allowed the enemy to regroup.49 Towards the end of this debate he 
returned to London where he was dismayed to find that, on Vietnam, even pro-American 
politicians ‘felt the US position there is deteriorating, and expected the same to be true in 
time of President Johnson’s popularity at home.’50 Renewed instability within Vietnam 
during the Spring of 1966, with Buddhist demonstrations against the pro-American 
 16 
regime, added to the difficulties and Bruce concluded that, ‘If a neutralist Government 
should ever be installed in Saigon, it would probably be replaced before long by a 
Communist one.’51 There were also predictions that, aside from the probable decline in 
Johnson’s popularity as military success remained elusive, the war would have a 
detrimental effect on the US economy, pushing up inflation and creating balance of 
payments problems, while the danger loomed larger of American bombing of sensitive 
targets in North Vietnam, around Hanoi and Haiphong.52 Returning to Washington in 
May, Bruce found the President under increasing pressure to bomb oil installations near 
the North’s biggest cities. ‘The present political atmosphere in Washington is one of 
unhappiness, frustration and irritation’, noted Bruce, ‘This, I fear, will persist as long as 
the Vietnam War lasts.’53  When the bombing of oil installations went forward in June it 
caused less civilian deaths than feared, but still led the British government to the 
unprecedented step of publicly dissociating itself from the US action and provoked 
further demonstrations outside the embassy.54 As to Bruce’s hopes of using the Soviets to 
draw the North into peace negotiations, Harold Wilson raised the issue on a trip to 
Moscow in July but found them unwilling to help. Instead, they confidently predicted a 
growing rift between Johnson and the American people over the conflict.55 Towards the 
end of the year, Bruce had to admit that there was little hope of a diplomatic solution. ‘In 
spite of all our efforts our Government has made to induce the North Vietnamese to enter 
into some sort of peaceful agreement with us, there is no sign of an inclination on their 
part to do so.’56 
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 As 1967 dawned, there seemed no respite in the conflict and the Ambassador 
remained privately critical of aspects of American policy. One concern was the failure of 
the country’s propaganda effort to win over its critics. ‘Our public affairs people in 
Washington and Saigon seem to have no feel whatever for presenting our Government’s 
case’, he wrote in January.  He was appalled when ‘one of our officials in Saigon took it 
upon himself to inform [a British Daily Telegraph] reporter that for the first time 
defections from the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Forces rose in 1965 proportionately 
above the South Vietnamese army desertion rate’, a statement that could only draw 
attention to the high rate of such desertions. The Ambassador also recognized the 
problems created by uncontrolled television access in Vietnam, as evidenced by a BBC 
programme that ‘showed a young American soldier, clearly under strain, who told the 
interviewer that he would shoot Viet Cong children because if he did not, they would 
grow up and shoot him.’57 Bruce himself had little time for what he considered the one-
sided reporting on Vietnam by the British media. It was unjust, he thought, to condemn 
the deaths caused by American bombing and play down ‘the calculated use of terror by 
the Viet Cong in South Vietnam.’58 This, however, only confirmed the point that 
Washington was losing the propaganda war. 
 
 In February 1967 Bruce was deeply involved in the so-called ‘Sunflower’ talks, 
when Soviet premier Kosygin visited London and discussed possible routes towards a 
peace settlement with Harold Wilson. Behind the scenes US officials, including the 
CIA’s Chester Cooper and Bruce, advised the British Prime Minister on tactics. The talks 
coincided with another ‘bombing halt.’ Bruce’s account betrays little of his personal view 
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on events, and no criticism of the US decision, at a delicate point, to alter its negotiating 
position – an action which arguably doomed the talks to failure and made Wilson livid.59 
However, in the midst of the talks Bruce did ‘express a personal opinion on the adverse 
political effects of a renewal of bombing before Kosygin left London’, and this helped 
secure an extension of the halt.60 A subsequent attempt to extend the halt even further led 
to ‘some rather angry interchanges with Walt Rostow’, who had succeeded MacGeorge 
Bundy as National Security Adviser, before the initiative completely broke down.61 
Eighteen months later Bruce was less restrained in his comments and confided in his 
diary that Rostow ‘behaved almost hysterically’ during Sunflower.62 
 
Retrenchment 
With the latest, and perhaps most promising attempt at a diplomatic settlement of the war 
having failed, Bruce’s attention turned to ways of minimizing the costs of the war to the 
US. Although the point does not emerge clearly from the diary, his thoughts were 
probably influenced by the discussion that followed a request, on 10 March 1967, by the 
US commander, General William Westmoreland, for 200,000 extra troops. The request, 
backed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was greeted with scepticism by McNamara. The 
Defense Secretary, the former ‘hawk’ who had pressed Johnson to escalate in 1964-65, 
had become increasingly dismayed by the failure to make progress in an increasingly-
destructive conflict. There followed what has been called ‘the most ferocious debate of 
the war’ in Washington,63 in which Bruce showed his sympathies were with McNamara. 
Several weeks into the debate, in a conversation with William Porter (former deputy US 
ambassador in Saigon) about the failure to train the South Vietnamese army in guerrilla 
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warfare techniques, Bruce suggested ‘drawing a defensive line across Vietnam, 
announcing our intention to repel any attacks against it, and reduce infiltration through it 
as far as practicable.’ This was interesting for a number of reasons. First, the idea of an 
interdiction line is generally associated with McNamara. It appeared as a policy 
recommendation from him in October 1966, when he calculated its cost as $1 billion and 
believed it would need up to 20,000 troops to man such a system of fences, wires and 
censors. But some Americans had been thinking of such a scheme since the late 1950s64 
and Bruce had discussed a plan for ‘sealing off infiltrations from the North over the 
demarcation line, and mopping up behind it’ with McNamara in March 1965.65 In the 
past the Pentagon believed it could not spare the forces necessary for such a scheme but, 
with rising US troop numbers, Bruce felt it could be investigated once more: ‘If such an 
accomplishment took place, we could then cease military activities in the  North, but be 
ready to resume them if necessary… [while] behind this barrier the South Vietnamese 
and ourselves would accelerate pacification efforts and step up movements against the 
Viet Cong.’ Porter rightly doubted that the military would be interested.66 But the idea 
shows that Bruce was again thinking of minimizing the costs of the war and is not the 
only evidence that he was close to McNamara’s now-sceptical view of the war. 
 
 The Defense Secretary was in London on 10 May, soon after Bruce’s 
conversation with Porter, and handed the Ambassador a copy of a memorandum he had 
drawn up on Vietnam. This was evidently a copy of that sent to the President on 19 May, 
which set out the dangers of further escalation of the war, including a ‘serious 
confrontation’ with the USSR and China, and was weighted in favour of a more 
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defensive approach. He now wanted to reduce the bombing of the North, put a limit on 
extra troop deployments and make a renewed effort at negotiation with Hanoi.67 The 
contents of the memorandum inspired Bruce to draw up his own sympathetic 
memorandum, one which may have encouraged McNamara to press on with his case. 
Bruce spent the evening of 10 May writing it and sent it to the Defense Secretary the 
following day.68 
 
The May 1967 memorandum represents the fullest appreciation Bruce ever wrote 
on the war, running to four sides of single-spaced type. From the outset his doubts about 
the war were clear: 
To have our national identity involved in the outcome of an operation on such a 
comparatively small military scale, in a country unfamiliar to most Americans, in 
support of a people of whom we know little, would, under ordinary 
circumstances, be considered… a wild exaggeration of priorities.  
Yet, as an experienced diplomat, he was aware that these were not ordinary 
circumstances and he believed it less profitable to dwell on the causes of the current 
imbroglio than to consider ‘a practicable solution to it.’ It was not possible simply to 
walk away from the problem, because ‘in the estimation of our compatriots, and much of 
the rest of the world, the issue has become an obsession, a touchstone of our wisdom or 
lack of it.’ Bruce also believed that American credibility as an ally was at stake: ‘We 
have pledged our honor to the protection of a state, on behalf of which we had contractual 
obligations under Seato [the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation, formed in 1954], 
against external aggression.’  
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Whatever justice lay in the cause however, the ambassador, like President 
Johnson, believed in treading a careful line between the extremes of surrender and 
massive escalation. He rejected the idea of ‘pulverizing the puny population of North 
Vietnam’ because this risked drawing China and the Soviet Union into the conflict, and 
he warned against handing the war over to the military chiefs, who were ‘usually 
insensitive… to the political considerations that must be paramount.’ As far as Bruce 
could see, bombing had not ‘fatally interdicted the logistical flow of materials from North 
to South, or… reduced enemy morale to an unbearable degree’ and it was ‘madness to 
contemplate achieving our aims by much further escalation in North Vietnam.’ Bruce 
repeated his fear that escalation on these lines – through operations in Cambodia and 
Laos perhaps, or by mining Haiphong harbor, risking damage to Soviet ships – raised the 
danger of Chinese and Soviet intervention, ‘transforming a small conflict into one of 
potentially mammoth proportions.’ He also pointed out that the Soviets could always 
react to US actions by creating a crisis elsewhere in the world, perhaps over Berlin, 
thereby ‘engaging our energies on widely separated fronts.’ As it was, Bruce still stuck to 
his view that the Soviets ‘would prefer to have this episode terminated.’ It was not as if 
the American military could guarantee that escalation could guarantee victory: ‘even so 
optimistic a warrior as General Westmoreland only offers us, if large reinforcements are 
furnished him, the indefinite prospects of indefinite attrition.’ A further escalation of US 
involvement seemed pointless. More troops would simply mean ‘higher casualties’ and 
an ‘already unpopular war will become increasingly unpopular…’ 
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What, then, did Bruce believe was the solution to America’s dilemma? He 
reasserted the ‘overriding importance of political over military factors’ and wrote of the 
need for President Johnson to disregard ‘transitory pressures’ in favor of the ‘right’ 
decision ‘morally and strategically…’ Bruce, like McNamara, believed this solution must 
be one of retrenchment in Vietnam, while not abandoning America’s ally. Washington 
should declare ‘that the objectives of our bombing program have been satisfactorily 
achieved, and we intend to consolidate our defensive positions.’ Thus protected by the 
US, the Saigon government could focus on a ‘pacification’ process in the South, designed 
to root out subversion, undermine support for the Viet Cong and create a stable 
democracy. Here Bruce played up his own familiarity during the Second World War, 
with unconventional warfare techniques. He repeated his long-held view that American 
generals must stop focusing on ‘orthodox methods primarily suited to conditions of open 
warfare’ in favor of training South Vietnamese troops ‘as night guerrillas’, able to take on 
the Viet Cong, who ‘currently seem to possess an overwhelming nocturnal superiority…’ 
Alongside such military pressures on the insurgents, Bruce also believed in offering, 
‘eventually’, an amnesty to them. His program was therefore based, like McNamara’s, on 
avoiding the dangers of escalation, reducing the bombing of the North, putting a cap on 
US ground forces, who should adopt a defensive posture, and relying on the South 
Vietnamese themselves, properly trained in guerrilla warfare techniques, to carry the war 
to the enemy. Yet the Ambassador also realized there was a potential flaw in his scheme. 
What if the North responded with ‘fresh aggression’? In this case, he could only suggest 
that the US be ‘prepared to resume and intensify our former military actions.’ This limp 
ending may have come about because Bruce already felt the memorandum ‘overlong’, a 
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problem for which he apologized to McNamara in the next paragraph, before repeating 
his worries about the crisis brought on by Vietnam and signing off. The same haste may 
explain why, in a striking omission, he had nothing to say about a diplomatic solution to 
the war.69 
 
There are indications that a new consensus was germinating among those with 
whom the Ambassador discussed Vietnam at this time, a consensus that it was time to 
end the escalation of US involvement in the war, while somehow holding on to South 
Vietnam. For example, Bruce also discussed his ideas with the former National Security 
Adviser, MacGeorge Bundy, who was sympathetic and encouraged him to put them to 
the President.70 Soon afterwards, when Bruce was in Washington again, Averell 
Harriman ‘advanced a theory about ceasing our bombing in Vietnam, except on the 
infiltration routes, in the hope of reaching in time an agreement with the Soviets to co-
operate with us to effect a truce of sorts.’71 But, apart from the military and Walt Rostow, 
other voices still talked of continued escalation. One was Bill Stearman, who had just 
served for eighteen months in the Saigon embassy, who favoured sending more troops 
and continuing the bombing campaign.72 For the moment, the war went on. 
Westmoreland did not get all the troops he requested, but neither did McNamara’s 
alternative strategy triumph. Indeed, his views put him increasingly at odds with Rostow 
and Johnson, eventually leading the President to decide in late 1967 that his Secretary of 
Defense must be replaced.73 
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Whatever doubts surrounded McNamara’s position, Bruce continued to prefer a 
policy of retrenchment to escalation. He again set out the logic of such a strategy, in 
rather optimistic terms, in his diary during September:  
the establishment of the McNamara line on the 17th Parallel will be followed by a 
cessation of bombing of the North, except for a continuance of attacks on 
infiltration groups.  Then with the new Government established in Saigon, the 
time might be appropriate for us to insist upon the training of Vietnamese militia 
units in guerrilla warfare, and institution of land reforms, elimination as far as 
practicable of governmental graft, and other remedial legislation of a social 
nature.  If Hanoi does not then respond to our overtures, we could resume 
bombing in the North. 
But the same diary entry also betrayed a feeling that time might be running out for such a 
solution. ‘In recent conversations here with Americans and foreigners,’ he noted, ‘I have 
sensed a distinct falling off in support for our policy in Vietnam.’ The US propaganda 
campaign was still ineffective.74 Bruce was further concerned that, in addition to the 
‘chronic’ criticism of the Left, even ‘important British mainstream opinion’ was turning 
against the American war.75 The ambassador was now reduced to slipping out of his 
embassy by the back door to avoid the persistent demonstrations outside.76 There was a 
particularly violent protest on 22 October 1967 when an angry mob managed to throw 
bricks through the embassy windows and hospitalized a dozen police officers who tried 
to hold them back.77 Reports from Washington suggested that divisions there were also 
growing bitterer.78 Meanwhile, diplomatic talks seemed as far off as ever. ‘I do not 
believe a really objective observer of the President’s attempts to draw the North 
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Vietnamese officials to a conference table could find any parallel in the history of 
warfare,’ the Ambassador complained. ‘The most powerful nation in the world has given 
its comparatively puny enemy every opportunity to save face, at the loss of its own.’79  
 
Tet 
In early February 1968 Bruce was again in Washington. His visit once more coincided 
with key events, this time the so-called ‘Tet offensive’ launched by the communists. At 
first, despite the widespread violence across South Vietnam, the offensive did not seem a 
decisive event. When Bruce saw Johnson in Washington on 6 February 1968, the 
President appeared untroubled. ‘If this vigorous, impressive man is perturbed over his 
tribulations it was not evident today’, wrote the ambassador, adding that ‘Johnson is like 
an elemental force of nature…’  In the US capital Bruce found considerable that 
‘preoccupation with Vietnam is all-pervasive’ but there was still optimism. The journalist 
Joe Alsop was ‘exultant over the course of events in Vietnam, saying the flower of the 
Vietcong cadres has been plucked. I was startled by his excessive praise of General 
Westmoreland…’ At a White House meeting, Walt Rostow ‘was hawkishly gratified by 
how things are going in Vietnam.’80 But Bruce himself was more sceptical about the 
situation. During another meeting with the President on the 9th, Johnson read out ‘a 
seven-page telegram he had just received from General Westmoreland, whose confidence 
in the military outlook I hope but do not believe will prove justified.’81 Bruce confided 
his own views in his diary towards the end of that fateful month: 
The more I think about the Vietnam affair, the more convinced I am of my long 
held theory that the original error was due to the mentality of our Army 
 26 
Commanders, who with few exceptions never like to depart from orthodoxy. If 
when our advisers first went there they had to tried to instruct the South 
Vietnamese to fight in the manner prescribed by General Giap [the North 
Vietnamese commander] in his manual for the training of the North Vietnamese 
and Viet Cong, the present situation might have been different.  The South 
Vietnamese should have been ready to go out in black pajamas like their hostile 
countrymen and engage in night – as well as daytime – guerrilla activities, instead 
of following the rules of conventional warfare.82 
 
Bruce also remained doubtful about the prospects for a diplomatic settlement. 
Since the failure of the Sunflower talks he had come to the conclusion that, contrary to 
his earlier hopes, the Soviet Union was not interested in ending the war.  ‘[T]hey are 
reaping many advantages from its continuance,’ he now reasoned, ‘It is true the provision 
by them of military supplies, petroleum, and other contributions is costly, but 
insignificant compared to our own outlays.  Moreover, they suffer no military losses and 
have no domestic political problems connected with it.’83 He was not alone in his 
pessimism, though others were less concerned with the chances for diplomacy than with 
the uncertain future of American politics, as the Presidential primaries got underway 
against the background of grave popular doubts about the war. The Tet offensive may 
have decimated the Viet Cong but the very fact that it had occurred, and on such a scale, 
had stunned the public and led to media talk of an ‘unwinnable’ struggle. The veteran 
British commentator on American affairs, Alistair Cooke, feared that Vietnam could 
prevent Johnson from winning the Democratic nomination and even predicted (with 
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remarkable prescience) riots at the party’s convention in August.84 The US journalist 
Drew Middleton told Bruce that the Presidential election would become ‘mixed up with 
issues such as Black Power, violence in the streets, the status of the war in Vietnam, the 
white backlash, housing, and other hot controversies.’85 Only days after these 
conversations, as Bruce set off on another of his visits to Washington, came Johnson’s 
dual announcement of a limitation to the Rolling Thunder bombing campaign and his 
decision not to run for the Presidency. The ambassador considered the latter news the real 
‘bombshell’ and a ‘colossal’ one at that. It was ‘as if Julius Caesar had not crossed the 
Rubicon.’86 The President’s speech did at least pave the way for negotiations between the 
North Vietnamese and a US team, led by Averell Harriman, in Paris. But Bruce was all 
too aware that progress towards a settlement would be slow87 and, as Johnson’s 
Presidency drew to a close, he felt it ‘ironic that a man who has done so much for his 
country in coping with its domestic problems should have all his accomplishments 
obscured by the Vietnam affair.’88 
 
Conclusion 
Bruce was very much on the periphery of decision-making on the Vietnam War. He was 
not even informed of certain key decisions being discussed in Washington. At the very 
end of the Presidency, for example, when Johnson announced an end to bombing of 
North Vietnam, Bruce recorded that. ‘We know nothing about this, except what we have 
read in the papers, for the secret has been fairly well kept.’89 As an experienced diplomat 
he recognised, as he once told Johnson, that, ‘Ambassadors are not policy-makers’ and he 
loyally accepted decisions made back home, with no sign that he ever even considered 
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resigning over the war.90 A true professional, Bruce carried out his instructions even 
when he had grave doubts about them, as when he was requested to deter Wilson from 
commenting on Vietnam during a speech to the UN. ‘I am not sure’, Bruce confided in 
his diary, ‘if President Johnson were making a speech to the UN he would welcome 
advice from the British as to what its contents should be.’91 He had a persistent tendency 
to support Johnson’s policy even though it was clearly not working. In January 1966, for 
example, the ambassador commented that ‘The President has wisely steered a middle 
course between the rocky cliffs of extremism. But his popularity as a pilot is 
diminishing.’92 Bruce remained an admirer of his chief and of his middle-of-the road 
policies, as America sank ever deeper into the quagmire. His complaint to Washington 
over the handling of the Sunflower talks was a rare note of protest.93 The ambassador’s 
belief in civilian control of the war effort, fully revealed in his memorandum of 11 May 
1967, would certainly put him at odds with General Westmoreland and revisionist 
historians, like Harry Summers, who have argued that the military should have been 
allowed to pursue the war in their own way.94 
 
Yet, it would be unjust to see Bruce as a cipher of the President, an official who 
simply mirrored the consensus at home. His diary reveals that, in private, he had his own 
outlook. In the mid-1960s, Vietnam loomed so large in his life that he could not avoid 
taking a view on it, especially when other US leaders, up to the President himself, asked 
for his opinions. While, in public, Bruce was content to defend US policy, in private he 
could be much more sceptical about the official line. Most important, he consistently 
argued that ‘our military have almost completely failed to adjust their strategy and tactics 
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to the requirements of guerrilla warfare.’95 His experience in the OAS and as Ambassador 
to Paris during France’s war in Indochina helps to explain why his doubts echo those 
found in the Central Intelligence Agency, including a recognition of communist 
determination, concern over the fragility of the South Vietnamese regime and the desire 
to develop a proper anti-guerrilla strategy.96 Indeed, his concern on such points in 1963-
65 makes it difficult to decide why, at the crucial point around November 1964, he 
backed McNamara’s preference for deeper involvement, beginning with Rolling 
Thunder. Then again, as Fredrik Logevall has argued, many US policy-makers were 
pessimistic about the prospects for Vietnam, yet opted for war.97 It was a choice they 
lived to regret as, over the following two years, they became all too aware of weaknesses 
in the US position and, in the Spring of 1967, some began to consider a different 
approach, based on retrenchment. It can be claimed that Bruce had a major impact on the 
running of the war even then. For the opposition from the military and Rostow ensured 
that retrenchment was rejected. However, if Bruce did have an influence, it was in 
helping reinforce McNamara’s views, a point that was also evident in their interest in an 
interdiction line. For, while retrenchment may have been ruled out in May 1967, it 
became the new consensus a year later, in the wake of the Tet offensive. To his credit 
Bruce, whatever his loyalty to his President and the anti-communist cause, had been a 
harbinger of the new consensus that pointed a way out of the quagmire, however slow 
that course proved to be.
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I am grateful to the British Academy and the University of Nottingham for funding research into David 
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